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I.

Introduction
Education is an important aspect of religious life. Most parents aspire to raise their children in their own religion, defined broadly to include as "religion" any belief system that speaks to spiritual needs and for which there is a community of adherents.
They also provide their children with a "secular" education that enhances their productivity as workers, as consumers, and as members of society. Individuals may be viewed as choosing a portfolio of human capital investments, some of which are religious (i.e., specific to a particular belief system) and the rest of which are secular (i.e., general with respect to religion). Religious and secular education are thus substitutes for each other as they compete for investment resources, primarily time and money.
The goal (output) of education is the formation of human capital. The prototype educational process is formal schooling, a system especially well suited to the formation of cognitive knowledge and certain types of decision-making skills. In a modern economic setting formal schooling is also an important means of acquiring occupational skills that associate positively -and often strongly -with future earning power. Another method of human capital formation involves experience with activities that provide skills through observation, repetition or familiarity. On-the-job training is but one example.
Other human capital is accumulated through social interactions that provide feedback about the desirability of various behaviors and produce memories crucial for identity formation.
All three methods of education -schooling, experience and socialization -are important determinants of the human capital available to an adult decision-maker and affect his or her resource allocation decisions. The economics literature tends to focus on those types of human capital most relevant for the workplace, on investments in 1 schooling and experience that raise the productivity of labor and therefore hourly earnings (Mincer 1974; 1984) . Other types of human capital that have received attention include investments in health (Schultz, T. Paul 1993; Schultz, T.W. 1980) , family (marriage and children) (Becker 1981; Schultz, T.P. 1981) , language (Chiswick, B.R. and Miller 1995) , culture (including the arts) (Filer 1990; Smith 1998) , religion (Iannaccone 1990) , and consumption (Becker 1996) .
Religious human capital is defined as knowledge, skill, experience and memories that enhance productivity in religious activities but have no effect on the productivity of resources allocated to other types of output (Chiswick, C.U. 1999; Iannaccone 1990 ).
Examples of investment in religious human capital include the study (formal and informal) of religious subjects, participation in religious ritual at home and in the church (or its analogue for non-Christian religions), experiencing religious holidays and life cycle events, involvement in religious communal life, and learning the language used for religious observance. It is not simply that the value (utility) of religious experience is sensitive to the level of religion-specific human capital applied to a given set of resources, for the content of the religious human capital embodied in a person in some sense defines that person's religion. (Chiswick, C.U. 1999 ). As such, it is central to religious experience and a crucial aspect of the intergenerational transmission of each religion (Chiswick, B.R. and Chiswick 2000) .
Education involves ideas as well as skills, and various studies suggest ways in which religious human capital raises the productivity of other types of human capital (Chiswick, C.U. 2001; Iannaccone 1998; Lehrer and Chiswick 1993) .. It has also been argued that religious education has a positive effect on the productivity of secular education, with positive complementarities between these two investment activities (Hollander, Kahana, and Lecker 2002) . However less attention has been paid to the effects of secular on religious education, which may be either positive or negative. A modern secular education generally increases the productivity of investments in other types of human capital and thus may be expected to have a similar effect on religious education. Yet religious education often appears to be structured around the notion that secular education leads to ideas and behaviors that are undesirable and that need to be counteracted or even destroyed. Thus while secular education may be a desirable investment overall, some of its components have adverse effects on the productivity of religious training that offset some of the positive complementarities and make the overall effect ambiguous. This paper focuses on how the curricula associated with secular and religious education, respectively, affect mutual complementarities in the production of these two types of human capital. Section II reviews the concept of religious human capital and presents a model of the educational choices. Section III uses this model to discuss complementarity properties as they pertain to each type of education. Section IV applies the model to two instances of religious change, the conflict between science and religion during the European Enlightenment and the development of new synagogue movements by American Jews during the twentieth century. Section V concludes with some implications for the life of religious communities.
II. Religious Education and the Human Capital Portfolio
The demand for religious education is derived from the production function for religious experience. The production function itself reflects a religious lifestyle choice, which is in turn affected by an individual's tastes and preferences. Utility-maximizing 3 consumers allocate their time between consumption and investment (education) and between religious and non-religious activities. The problem can be expressed as:
where R = Religion Y = All other consumption goods and services L R = Time spent in religious production L Y = Time spent in non-religious production L E = Total time spent in human capital formation and L* is the total time available for all purposes. The two consumption goods, Y and R, are home-produced with production functions that depend primarily on human capital specific to each activity:
where h Y = level (quality) of general human capital and h R = level (quality) of religious human capital
The level of human capital thus enters the production function indirectly as a determinant of the total amount of human capital,
which is (for simplicity) the sole input for producing the corresponding consumption good.
Each type of human capital is in turn produced by an educational process with its own production function, the main input to which is the student's time. These can be written inversely as cost functions, expressing the time cost of education as a function of the level of skill to be acquired. This problem is solved by maximizing the Lagrangian function:
Its first-order conditions can be solved to yield
Equaton (8) equates the marginal rate of substition in consumption between religious and non-religious uses of time to -1, the slope of the time budget line, requiring that the marginal value of time be the same in both consumption activities. Equations (9) and (10) equate the slopes of the human capital quantity-quality isoquants, L R /h R and L Y /h Y respectively, to the marginal cost of the corresponding type of education, allocating time to each type of education up to the point where the marginal time required for an additional unit of human capital is the same as the opportunity cost of that time in consumption activities. Equation (11), which expresses the time constraint as a function of the levels of the two types of education, is obtained by solving (9) and (10) for L R and L Y and substituting the result into the constraint in (1).
Equations (9) and (10) may also be solved for h R and h Y, the result substitituted into equation (8) and terms rearranged to yield:
The expression on the left-hand side of this equation is the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between h R and h Y , the slope of an indifference curve between levels of the two types of education. The right-hand side is the slope of a production possibility frontier (PPF) that holds constant L E, the total resources devoted to education .
Optimization thus requires tangency between an indifference curve and a human capital PPF determined by the allocation of time between consumption and education.
By varying the amount of time devoted to education, equation (12) implies an expansion path with a positive slope as long as both h Y and h R are normal (in the sense that more resources devoted to education raises the demand for each type). In contrast, the boundary in equation (11) 
III. The Effects of Externalities on Religious Education
Supply-side complementarity between investments in the two types of human capital, described by the sign and magnitude of the parameter ω, affects the shape of the opportunity set and the PPF curves. If secular education confers positive externalities on religious education (ω<0), these curves would be bowed even further outward and the optimal investment for both types of human capital would be greater. If two types of human capital have few complementarities and/or negative externalities (ω>0) the family of PPF curves would be less concave and the optimal portfolio would not only be smaller but would also display a greater tendency toward specialization in investment. Negative externalities have two effects on the optimal allocation of resources.
Because they increase the costs of education there is a scale effect, reducing the total amount of human capital attainable from fixed resources and hence the area under both the PPF and the overall time constraint. Negative externalities also induce a substitution effect, increasing the incentive to concentrate resources in one or the other type of human capital because the externalities raise the cost of combining the two. For example, an expansion path passing through the optimum at point E in Figure 2 (corresponding to the PPF family to which AEB belongs) would be everywhere to the left of the noexternalities expansion path passing through point C. Since externalities have a similar effect on the shape of the overall time constraint, altering it less near the corners than in the interior, the consumer's optimum will be lower on the expansion path the greater the negative externalities. While there will always be differences in the educational outcomes chosen by these two people, these differences will be far greater in the presence of negative externalities. The expansion path corresponding to point E lies to the left of the expansion path for point C, while the path for E' lies to the right of the one for C'.
Geometrically, the more outwardly-bowed (convex) the PPF, the closer the expansion paths for people with different preferences. Economically, this occurs because positive externalities reduce the cost of combining the two types of education, while negative externalities have the opposite effect.
The illustrations thus far have assumed smooth production functions, yet educational is often organized as a series of levels, or degrees, reflecting discontinuities in the underlying process. This characteristic suggests that one or both of the education production functions, φ(h Y ) for general education or γ(h R ) for religious education, might be written as a step function. To take a simple case, suppose φ(h Y ) is subject to a minimum threshold at C* such that there is little or no value to lower levels of general education. Figure 4 illustrates this case by effectively eliminating the area under this threshold (shaded) from the opportunity set. This same graph would also illustrate the effect of an exogenous educational standard imposed by law or custom. 
IV. Responses to Negative Externalities: Some Applications
A. Science vs. Religion in the Enlightenment
The Enlightenment refers to a period in post-Medieval European history in which proponents of a newly discovered faith in science and rationality collided with the guardians of the Christian religious status quo. The traditional social and economic order provided little opportunity or incentive for ordinary people to acquire a secular education, its scholarly traditions were skewed toward investment in religion-specific human capital, and hostility toward religious dissention was common. The new ideas offered the possibility to break free of the religious establishment by "assimilating" into a larger society of scholars for whom affiliation with a particular religion was not a prerequisite.
Universities and learned societies attracted people of various backgrounds, encouraging the ideas of freethinkers, agnostics and even atheists.
But part of the price of an advanced secular education and professional life was a penalty -explicit or implicit -on religious observance. Students seeking higher education would have faced incentives to specialize, choosing between religious schools or secular universities with their respective differences in lifestyles. "Enlightened" philosophers and scientists often substantially reduced their observance of religious traditions and especially their investment in religion-specific human capital. The universities taught secular subjects from a "godless" perspective that could be viewed as blasphemous, while the religious curriculum was focussed inward and therefore "backward" by the standards of Enlightenment. The consequent split in the community was extreme, with marked differences in lifestyles and little overlap between the content of religious and general education.
Although this outcome was interpreted by both groups as an incompatibility between higher secular education and advanced religious learning, between assimilation and religious observance, the analysis in this paper suggests that this need not have been the case. It would have been sufficient cause for the split if religious observance imposed heavy costs on those choosing a secular profession, whether because of a cultural antagonism toward all religion among the educated or because of hostility toward a specific set of beliefs. If educated people responded to these incentives by distancing themselves from religion in general, becoming "secularists," then secularism would be understood as a threat to the authority of the religious establishment. The tension between science and religion was very real, but its root cause might have been strong negative supply-side externalities rather than incompatible subject matter.
The analysis here suggests that it is not the acquisition of general human capital that undermines the legitimacy of religion but rather the failure to acquire specifically religious human capital. Strategies for assimilation into general society that neglect religious education would weaken the individual's attachment to a specific religion, potentially generating reverse bandwagon effects that would weaken the entire religious community. In contrast, strategies that successfully adapt religious education to a new social environment could enhance religious observance, developing a distinctively modern religious culture that could eventually generate its own positive bandwagon effects.
B. Education of American Jewry
European Jews who migrated to America, primarily near the turn of the twentieth century came from lands of limited opportunities and significant religious persecution.
America was much more hospitable than Europe to Jewish life, presenting far more One important Jewish response to this "threat" was to work to make American society more hospitable to Jews and thus reduce the negative externalities between Jewish and general education. The Anti-Defamation League was organized for this purpose, and many Jewish communal organizations had units focussing on political action or education of the general public, as appropriate. Interfaith activities also received support at all levels, based on the belief that anti-Semitism was born of ignorance and could be eroded by friendly relations between Jews and non-Jews (Silberman 1985) . The hypothesized effects of these activities are illustrated in Figure 5 as a reduction in the convexity of the PPF, moving the optimum human capital portfolio from point E to F. 
V. Implications for Religious-Group Behavior Patterns
Apart from its utility-enhancing role, religious human capital is an important underpinning of intergenerational continuity for the religious community. In this regard it serves two different functions. First, religion-specific human capital is what distinguishes adherents from everyone else, defining a separate religion and the adherents as members of an identifiable religious community. As such, the human capital acquired by each generation affects its ability to transmit that religion from parents to children. In addition, religious human capital, like most other forms of human capital, is a homogomous marital trait (i.e., one for which "like marries like") (Becker 1981) . People with high levels of religious human capital tend to select spouses who also have high levels, forming family units for which the home production of religious education is more efficient (Chiswick, C.U. 1998) . Conversely, people with low levels of religious human 1 It is instructive to compare American Jewish education to that of Israeli Jewry. Since its independence in 1948, Jewish public schools in Israel have had two separate tracks, one religious and the other secular (Troen 2001) . At first the difference was primarily a matter of emphasis, with considerable overlap in the curriculum, and the system could have been illustrated as the difference between points C and C' in Figure 3 . In subsequent decades, however, budget cuts and politics combined to reduce specifically Jewish subjects in the secular schools and non-Jewish subjects in the religious schools. Religious lifestyles would increasingly de-emphasize achievement in the general sphere, while the lifestyles of second-and third-generation secular Jews would have less and less use for specifically Jewish human capital. Each decade would find the negative externalities more pronounced, the community would become more polarized toward the extremes and the two groups would have less and less in common ((Etzioni-Halevy 2002) ). Eventually their situation would become more like points E' and E, respectively, in Figure 3 .
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capital are inefficient producers of religion and tend to marry others who are similarly inefficient.
The less religious human capital a person brings to the marriage market, the greater the probability that religion is outweighed by other attributes of a potential spouse, and the higher the probability of out-marriage. Whether the spouses have the same or different religions, however, a couple with less religious human capital would be relatively less efficient both as consumers of religion and as religious educators in the home. Without communal support, their children are likely to become adults with even lower levels of religious human capital.
For intergenerational continuity, a religious community requires that its adherents invest in some minimum threshold of religion-specific human capital. This requirement underlies the quasi-public good aspect of religion that has been explored elsewhere (Iannaccone 1992) . Individual choices that tend to concentrate on general rather than religious education are often attributed to changes in preferences in favor of a nonreligious "secularism." The analysis developed above suggests that secularism itself may be endogenous, the outcome of a time allocation problem in which religious human capital is relatively costly to acquire.
In the early part of the twentieth century, many immigrants viewed "assimilation" as a high-priority goal and invested heavily in general American human capital, "Americanizing" their religious practices as well. By the later part of the twentieth century their grandchildren and great-grandchildren could be divided into those that felt that perhaps "assimilation" was bad -or, perhaps more accurately, that it was "too much of a good thing" -and those who were so assimilated that they didn't care. The analysis 16 here suggests that it was not the acquisition of general human capital that mattered for religious continuity but rather the reduced acquisition of group-specific human capital.
Strategies for assimilation that neglected religious education would have weakened the individual's attachment to the religion, generating reverse bandwagon effects that weakened the entire religious community. 
